Known during the Soviet era as Lenin Square, Freedom Square, which appears to the eye more like ‘Freedom Roundabout’, is at the heart of the bustling city of Tbilisi, the capital of the Caucasus nation of Georgia. Historians will also be aware that it was the location of an attempted assassination of President George W Bush in 2005 and the Bolsheviks’ 1907 Tiflis Bank Robbery. This small corner of the southern Caucuses has seen its fair share of historical and political turmoil. With protests erupting in the city in April of this year, it appears 2024 will be a year befitting Georgia’s complicated and convulsive history.
If a tourist, or a local, were to find themselves in Freedom Square, they would be wise to look a little closer, raising their eyes above the architecturally beautiful Tbilisi City Assembly to the house (or ‘glassle’) positioned high in the mountains, overlooking the core of Georgia’s capital. This is the home of Georgia’s wealthiest citizen; former Prime Minister and current honorary chairman of the ruling Georgian Dream Party, the multi-billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili.
It is a home even Ian Flemming may have struggled to design with words. Those who have watched the Ukrainian comedy Servant of the People, starring actor and now President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, may remember the scene from the opening episode whereby Ukrainian oligarchs plot the political direction of Ukraine from a sinister location overlooking Kyiv. In Georgia, however, this is not a TV show nor a James Bond novel, but the reality of the political situation in the country. An all-watching big brother oligarch, whose wealth is equal to 1/3rd of the country’s GDP and is able to dictate the political direction of this small nation through a monopoly of control over the ruling party. His choice of home seems nothing but a signal to his people that he is more than proud of this.
Within Georgian political discourse, in addition to the role of Ivanishvili, there are two driving factors that dominate the political landscape. The first is the national dream of joining the European Union; an ambition now enshrined within the constitution. The second driving factor is the desire to curtail Russian influence within Georgia. To many Georgians, these two aims are one and the same, and the re-introduction of the ‘Foreign Agent Law’ has catalyzed the political will of a large proportion of citizens to reject Russian-style politics and drive towards EU membership. The law would effectively sanction any organization receiving more than 20% of its funding from non-Georgian sources, meaning many pro-European civil society organizations would be penalized.
Within Georgia, there is stark opposition towards what is viewed as ‘Russian Expansion’ or more commonly just towards ‘Russia’. Within the heart of Tbilisi and its liberal suburbs such as Vake and Vera, it is commonplace to see impolite graffiti towards Russia and Russians. Some bars within the city have also introduced ‘VISA’s’ whereby Tbilisi’s large Russian population must sign forms stating their political opposition to Moscow in order to enter. The majority of this anti-Russian culture stems from the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, whereby areas such as Gori, famous as the hometown of Stalin, were bombed.
According to International Law, just under 20% of Georgia is occupied by Russia. This area comprises two separate regions; Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which have their own individual histories and relationships with both Georgia and Russia. While the vast majority of Georgian citizens view Russia as an occupier of Georgian territory, many pro-Russian citizens in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia dispute the details of the events in 2008, noting the European Union’s own Tskhinvali report which states the conflict was started by Georgia. An excellent short documentary released by the once revered BBC Newsnight demonstrates the horror and devastation both sides endured during the short 2008 conflict. In the week of the 14th of September, Ivanishvili intervened on this controversial issue by stating that Georgia should apologize to Russia for the 2008 conflict.
The importance of understanding the two core driving factors in Georgian political discourse is key to understanding the protest events of 2024.
In the sixteen years that have passed since the events of 2008, Georgians have felt, rightly or wrongly, to be on a tight-rope, waiting for further Russian ‘aggression’ and therefore a large proportion of the population is motivated to advocate against any potential domestic developments that may aid the Russian state. In correlation, Georgians’ desire for European Union membership for a host of reasons, including the conspicuous economic success of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, as well as the prospect of professional and educational opportunities in Europe, have served as motivation for Georgians, residing mostly in cities, to reject Russian style politics in favor of Europeanization.
For these reasons, the introduction of the ‘Foreign Agents Law’ was a cocktail bound to be spat out by a vast number of Georgians. The introduction of the bill saw nearly two months of protests along Rustaveli Avenue – the city’s main street which hosts the Parliament of Georgia and leads to Freedom Square. The protest eventually spread to other regions such as Batumi and were met with a somewhat undignified, violent, and ultimately disproportionate police response. That the bill was passed by Georgian Dream, the party led in the shadows by Russia-linked billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, presumably to fully solidify his grasp on Georgian politics, makes the situation so much like a novel as to defy belief.
The bill, now law as of September 2024, is a carbon copy of legislation introduced in Russia which has aimed to crack down on NGO’s and the media by requiring institutions receiving funding from abroad to declare themselves as Foreign Agents or face heavy fines. The bill itself will ultimately affect very few Georgians, but it is the wider consequences of its passing that unnerve the majority of Georgians. Most potently, the passing of the bill has caused disruption to Georgia’s EU ambitions, with high-profile members of the European Parliament, such as former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, calling for Georgia’s candidate status to be suspended while President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen criticized the bill concluding that ‘’Georgia is at a crossroads. It should stay the course on the road to Europe’’.
By the deadline of September 2nd, 2024 to register as a foreign agent, just 469 out of around 30,000 organizations understood to be working with foreign funding had elected to follow the rules of the new legislation. This stark resistance to comply demonstrates that this issue has not been swept under the rug despite the disappearance of the story from international news outlets, but is instead a situation that, while now simmering, will soon come to a boil. With a general election scheduled for October 2024, it would be wise for the international community to keep their eyes firmly on Georgia.
